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ABSTRACT
There is a known tension between the need to analyze personal
data to drive business and privacy concerns. Many data protection
regulations, including the EU General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) and the California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), set
out strict restrictions and obligations on companies that collect or
process personal data. Moreover, machine learning models them-
selves can be used to derive personal information, as demonstrated
by recent membership and attribute inference attacks. Anonymized
data, however, is exempt from data protection principles and obliga-
tions. Thus, models built on anonymized data are also exempt from
any privacy obligations, in addition to providing better protection
against such attacks on the training data.
Learning on anonymized data typically results in a significant
degradation in accuracy. Our goal in this work is to anonymize the
data in a way that minimizes the impact on the model accuracy.
We address this challenge by guiding our anonymization using the
knowledge encoded within the model, and targeting it to minimize
the impact on the modelâĂŹs accuracy, a process we call accuracy-
guided anonymization. We demonstrate that by focusing on the
modelâĂŹs accuracy rather than information loss, our method
outperforms state of the art k-anonymity methods in terms of
the achieved utility, in particular with high values of k and large
numbers of quasi-identifiers.
We also demonstrate that our approach achieves similar results
in its ability to prevent membership inference attacks as alternative
approaches based on differential privacy, and in some cases even bet-
ter results, while being much less complex and resource-intensive.
This shows that model-guided anonymization can, in some cases,
be a legitimate substitute for such methods, while averting some
of their inherent drawbacks such as complexity, performance over-
head and being fitted to specific model types. We also show that
our method is able to defend against other classes of attacks such
as attribute inference. As opposed to methods that rely on adding
noise during training, our approach does not rely on making any
modifications to the training algorithm itself, and can work even
with “black-box” models where the data owner has no control over
the training process. As such, it can be applied in a wide variety of
use cases, including ML-as-a-service.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Information accountability and us-
age control; Privacy protections; Digital rights management.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)1 sets out many
restrictions on the processing of personal data, as well as many
obligations on companies that collect and process personal infor-
mation. Similarly, the California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA)2
sets out several consumer rights in relation to personal informa-
tion being collected about them by businesses. Similar laws and
regulations are in the process of being enacted in Washington3 and
additional countries worldwide. Adhering to these regulations can
be a complex and costly task.
However, these regulations specifically exempt anonymized data
from those obligations. It is therefore very attractive for data collec-
tors to be able to perform their processing tasks on anonymized data.
GDPR, in its Recital 26, states that the principles of data protection
should not apply to anonymous information, namely information
which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person
or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the
data subject is not or no longer identifiable. CCPA, in its article
1798.145 (a), affirms that the obligations imposed on businesses
by this title shall not restrict a businessâĂŹs ability to collect, use,
retain, sell, or disclose consumer information that is deidentified or
is aggregate consumer information. “Deidentified” in this context
means information that cannot reasonably identify, relate to, de-
scribe, be capable of being associated with, or be linked, directly or
indirectly, to a particular consumer. Both regulations require that
technical safeguards be in place to prevent re-identification of con-
sumers, and that any “reasonable” means by which re-identification
may be performed should be taken into account.
Many data processing tasks nowadays entail complex analysis,
such as machine learning. In recent years, several attacks have
been developed that are able to infer sensitive information from
trained models. Examples include membership inference attacks,
where one can deduce whether a specific individual was part of the
training set or not; and model inversion attacks, also called attribute
inference attacks, where certain sensitive features may be inferred
1https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-protection-eu_en
2https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=
201720180AB375
3http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2019-20/Htm/Bills/Senate%20Bills/5376.
htm?q=20200302233918
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about individuals who participated in training a model. This has
led to the conclusion that machine learning models themselves
can be considered personal information [33], and therefore subject
to GDPR and similar laws. The recently published study of the
European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) on the impact
of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on artificial
intelligence4 found that, although AI is not explicitly mentioned
in the GPDR, many provisions in the GDPR are relevant to AI.
The authors assess the issue of re-identification and note that for
an item to be linked to a person, it is not necessary that the data
subject be identified with absolute certainty; a degree of probability
may be sufficient. They continue by proposing that this issue can
be addressed by ensuring that data is de-identified in ways that
make it more difficult to re-identify the data subject. They finally
conclude that consistent application of data protection principles,
when combined with the ability to efficiently use AI technology,
can contribute to the success of AI applications.
It is therefore desirable to be able to anonymize the AI models
themselves, i.e., ensure that the personal information of a specific in-
dividual that participated in the training set cannot be re-identified.
Past attempts at training machine learning models on anonymized
data have resulted in very poor accuracy [23], and it is therefore typ-
ically not employed in practice. This is especially the case for deep
learning, which tends to consume large amounts of raw data to be
able to produce accurate predictions. We show that our proposed
approach can preserve an acceptable level of accuracy, making
anonymous machine learning a feasible option for many enter-
prises.
Existing work on protecting the privacy of machine learning
training data, including differential privacy, typically either suffers
from significant accuracy loss, or ends up providing relatively low
privacy guarantees [17]. In addition, these methods require making
changes to the learning algorithms themselves as they incorporate
the perturbation into the model training process [1, 27]. They are
thus not suitable for scenarios in which the learning process is
performed by a third party and is not under the control of the
organization that owns (and therefore wants to anonymize) the
private data.
In this paper we present a method for anonymizing machine
learning models. Similar to some previous efforts, the method is
based on applying k-anonymity to the training data and then train-
ing the model on the anonymized dataset. However, our anony-
mization method is guided by the specific analysis that is to be
performed on the data, i.e., the machine learning model itself. In
other words, whereas, in the past, anonymization algorithms took
only data as input, we take both the training data and an existing
model. We make use of the knowledge encoded within the model
to produce an anonymization that is highly tailored. We call this
method accuracy-guided anonymization. Once the training dataset
is anonymized in this manner, (re-)training of the model is per-
formed to yield an anonymized model. We demonstrate that this
approach greatly outperforms state of the art anonymization tech-
niques in terms of the achieved utility, as measured by the resulting
model’s accuracy. We also demonstrate that this method is able to
4https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/641530/EPRS_-
STU(2020)641530_EN.pdf
produce good results even with fairly high values of k and larger
numbers of quasi-identifier attributes than previous works.
We also tested the effectiveness of our method as a mitigation
against membership inference attacks and compared it against
some existing implementations of differentially private models.
We found that the results acheived using our anonymization were
comparable to differential privacy in terms of the achieved model
accuracy versus attack accuracy, sometimes even doing slightly
better. This shows that model-guided anonymization can, in some
cases, be a legitimate substitute for such methods, while averting
some of their inherent drawbacks such as complexity, performance
overhead and being fitted to specific model types.
Our approach is generic and can be applied to any type of ma-
chine learningmodel. Since it does not rely onmakingmodifications
to the training process, it can be applied in a wide variety of use
cases, including machine learning as a service (ML-as-a-service
or MLaaS in short). ML-as-a-service provides an array of machine
learning services as part of cloud computing services, including
tools such as predictive analytics, deep learning, data visualisation,
natural language processing and more. This setting is particularly
useful for organizations that do not possess the required computing
resources to perform their training tasks locally. These cloud-based
tools are typically provided as a “black-box” with little to no ability
to affect the internals of the service implementation.
Similar to classic k-anonymity methods, our method can only be
applied to structured data, such as numeric, discrete or categorical
features. It cannot be applied directly to unstructured data such
as images. It also does not work well for very high-dimensional
datasets, or datasets with a very high level of uniqueness of records.
In the remainder of the paper we present the most relevant
related work in Section 2, describe the details of our method in
Section 3, present experimental results in Section 4 and finally
conclude in Section 5.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Protecting Datasets
A great body of prior work has focused on protecting the privacy of
individuals in datasets. K-anonymity was proposed by L. Sweeney
[32] to address the problem of releasing personal data while preserv-
ing individual privacy. This is a method to reduce the likelihood of
any single person being identified when the dataset is linked with
other, external data sources. The approach is based on generalizing
attributes and possibly deleting records until each record becomes
indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other records. A generalization
of a numeric attribute typically consists of a range of consecutive
values, whereas the generalization of a categorical attribute consists
of a sub-group of categories. The process of generalization is applied
only to those attributes that can be linked with other data sources
containing identifiers. Such attributes are called quasi-identifiers
(QI).
This initial work was followed by many extensions and improve-
ments. Since achieving optimal k-anonymity is NP-hard, many
polynomial heuristics have been proposed [10, 18, 19]. Researchers
have also focused on maximizing the utility of the anonymized
result [14].
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There has been some criticism of anonymization methods in
general and k-anonymity in particular, mostly revolving around
possible re-identification even after a dataset has been anonymized.
Examples such as the Netflix recommendation contest dataset that
was linked with an iMDB dataset to enable re-identification of cus-
tomers [25], or the ability to re-identify individuals from credit card
records despite the resolution of data being decreased on several
axes [3], have been used to justify the need for new, more robust
methods. However, a deeper analysis of these cases reveals that
this typically occurs when poor anonymization techniques were
applied [31] or when the chosen list of quasi-identifiers was not
exhaustive, leaving some attributes that could potentially be linked
to external datasets unaccounted for. The success of k-anonymity
is highly dependent on the choice of quasi-identifiers, with the
risk of re-identification decreasing as the number of QIs increases.
When correctly applied, the re-identification risk in a k-anonymized
dataset is at most 1/k [5].
Another shortcoming of the basic k-anonymity method is that
even though it prevents identity disclosure (re-identification), it
may fail to protect against attribute disclosure if all (or most of)
the k records within a similarity group share the same value of a
sensitive attribute [4]. For example, in the case of health records,
all k records within a group may share the same disease. Therefore,
knowing that an individual belongs to that group automatically
discloses their medical condition. To this end, extensions such as
l-diversity and t-closeness [21, 22] were developed.
Xiao et. al. [34] present the concept of personalized anonymity,
and describe a framework that performs the minimum generaliza-
tion for satisfying each individual’s personal privacy requirements,
thus retaining the largest amount of information possible from
the microdata. Hajian et. al. [11] present a generalization-based
approach to simultaneously offer privacy preservation and discrim-
ination prevention. However, this solution is mainly focused on
acheiving non-discrimination and not on tailoring or improving
the anonymity method itself.
2.2 Protecting Machine Learning Training Sets
Several attacks have been able to reveal either whether an indi-
vidual was part of the training set (membership inference attacks)
or infer certain possibly sensitive properties of the training data
(attribute inference attacks) [7, 8, 29, 30]. As a result, a lot of work
has focused on protecting the privacy of the training dataset used
to train machine learning models.
One straightforward approach to applying the concept of k-
anonymity to machine learning is to perform anonymization on the
training data prior to training the learning algorithm. When these
methods are applied without considering the intended use of the
data, they tend to yield poor accuracy results [23]. Therefore, several
methods have been proposed to perform tailored anonymization
of the training data [16, 20]. The method presented by Iyengar
[16] takes into consideration predictive modeling as a target use of
the data, however it does not try to tailor the loss metrics to any
specific predictive modeling method. Rather, they use a generic
“classification metric” to measure the impurity of the target feature
within each similarity group.
The method described by LeFevre et al. [20] somewhat resem-
bles the one we employ, but with some considerable differences. In
the case of a single target model, they propose a greedy splitting
algorithm based on entropy minimization on the class label, which
is “reminiscent of algorithms for decision tree construction”. How-
ever, since their goal is to publish the anonymized dataset, they do
not use a specific machine learning model in the anonymization
process. They instead use the class label that will later be the target
of classification as the measure to determine the degree of homo-
geneity of the partitions, similar to [16]. In our work, we use an
initial, trained machine learning model as a starting point for the
anonymization process, using the model’s predictions on the data
as our similarity measure, as described in detail in Section 3. Thus,
the anonymization is truly tailored to a specific model.
In addition, their approach formapping the resulting 2-dimension-
al regions to a set of features on which to train the model differs
from ours, forcing them to apply the same recoding mechanism
to any test data before the model can be applied to it. Since the
recoding itself was built based on the raw, non-anonymized train-
ing data, it is possible that even in disclosing this function, some
information about the original data may be leaked. In our method,
test data can be used as is in the anonymized model, without having
to apply any special mapping to it. In Section 4 we show that, in
addition to these advantages, our approach achieves more useful
and practical results, especially for higher values of k and larger
numbers of quasi-identifier attributes.
More recently, approaches that add noise during the training
process have been proposed to protect the training set and counter
membership attacks [35]. The idea behind this approach is to reduce
the effect of any single individual on the model’s outcome. Some
have applied the principle of differential privacy (DP) to the training
process [1, 13], which provides more robust privacy guarantees.
These techniques tend to be highly tailored to specific machine
learning algorithms, and in some cases need to make further as-
sumptions on internal implementation details such as batch selec-
tion, the choice of loss function or optimization algorithm.
Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles [27], [28] transfers
to a “student” model the knowledge of an ensemble of “teacher”
models, with intuitive privacy provided by training teachers on
disjoint data and strong privacy guaranteed by noisy aggregation of
teachers’ answers. However, this approach assumes the availability
of a public or non-sensitive dataset on which the student model
can be trained. This dataset may be unlabeled, as the labels used for
student training are based on the predictions of the teacher models.
However, they assume that the public data has a similar distribution
to the private dataset, which may be difficult to achieve in practice.
There may even be cases where no similar public data is available,
as would be the case with highly sensitive and unique datasets
collected exclusively by governmental agencies, pharmaceutical
companies, specialized research laboratories, and so on.
Differential privacy, however, is not without its drawbacks. A
significant challenge when applying DP in practice is the choice of
the privacy budget (ϵ value). A recent survey of existing techniques
based on differential privacy [17] found that current mechanisms
for differentially private machine learning rarely offer acceptable
utility-privacy trade-offs for complex learning tasks. They analyzed
four different variants of differential privacy: naÃŕve composition
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(NC), advanced composition (AC), zero-concentrated differential
privacy (zCDP), and RÃľnyi differential privacy (RDP). These vari-
ants differ in their analysis of the cumulative privacy loss, and
thereby in the amount of noise that must be added in the train-
ing process to satisfy a particular privacy budget. They compared
both the accuracy acheived for specific ϵ values using each of these
variants, and the susceptibility of the resulting models to different
membership inference and attribute inference attacks. They found
that the level of privacy leakage (measured by the success of infer-
ence attacks) for each variant of differential privacy accords with
the actual amount of noise added to the model, and not necessarily
with the absolute ϵ values. This indicates that ϵ alone is not a good
indicator for the degree of privacy achieved. Their main finding is
that for complex learning tasks, settings that provide limited accu-
racy loss provide little effective privacy, and settings that provide
strong privacy result in useless models.
Moreover, Bagdasaryan et al. [2] have also shown that differen-
tially private training mechanisms have a disproportionate effect
on the accuracy of the model on underrepresented or complex sub-
groups, leading to increased bias towards those populations. The
same paper also warns that when using differentially private sto-
chastic gradient descent (DP-SGD), when applying both gradient
clipping and noise addition, training may fail to converge before
exhausting the privacy budget. This is the technique employed in
[1] (among others). Melis et al. [24] similarly found that participant-
level differentially private federated learning algorithms fail to
converge for smaller numbers of participants.
The most important difference between approaches based on
differential privacy or ensemble aggregation and our approach is
that they require complete control over the learning process. In all
of these cases, the learning algorithms themselves are modified to
guarantee the desired privacy properties. These approaches cannot
be applied at all in cases where the learning process occurs outside
the hands of the private data owner, such as with ML-as-a-service.
These services have become quite abundent in recent years, with
providers such as Google and Amazon enabling any customer in
possession of a dataset and a classification task to upload their
dataset and construct a model, even if they do not possess enough
computing power to perform this type of task locally. The details
of the ML implementation provided by these services are mostly
hidden from the customer, with only a few basic parameters avail-
able for tuning. There is, of course, no way to affect the training
process at the level needed to implement the above methods. Since
our method does not rely on making modifications to the training
process, it is much better suited for such scenarios.
3 MODEL-GUIDED ANONYMIZATION
In this section we describe in more detail the proposed approach
for machine learning model anonymization. Our implementation is
based on k-anonymity, but it is worth noting that the underlying k-
anonymity algorithm can be enhanced with additional guarantees
such as l-diversity and t-closeness, or even replaced with any other
method for perturbing datasets, such as noise addition, k-crowd
blending [9], etc. The overall privacy guarantee will be the one
provided by the underlying anonymization mechanism.
Many typical k-anonymity algorithms rely on finding groups
of at least k similar records that can be mapped together to the
same generalized value (on the quasi-identifier attributes), thus
fulfilling the requirement that these k records are indistinguishable
from each other. Some do this by iteratively choosing a feature and
splitting the domain of the feature along a chosen split value. Each
split creates a partition of the domain into non-overlapping regions.
The process stops when a region contains between k and 2k − 1
records, meaning that it can no longer be split without violating the
constraint. The resulting splits create a partitionning of the entire
domain into groups of k or more records, which serve as the basis
for the generalization.
The Median Mondrian method [19] chooses at each phase the
split attributewith thewidest normalized range and uses themedian
value as the split value. The Greedy algorithm [14] chooses the
candidate split based on minimal information loss. In our case,
we replace these criteria with minimal accuracy loss in the target
model.
The overall process of accuracy-guided anonymization is depicted
in Figure 1. The process starts with an initial model trained on the
raw training data. This is the model whose accuracy we will try to
preserve. To acheive this, we use the training data with the initial
model’s predictions on that data as input to the anonymization
process. Our goal is to use the model’s predictions to guide the
creation of groups of similar records to generalize together; in this
way, we get a generalization that is tailored to the specific model.
Next we train an anonymizer model on the training data, using as
labels the original model’s predictions. That is, we train a newmodel
to learn the target model’s “decision boundaries”. This is similar
to the student-teacher training or knowledge distillation concept
often employed as a means for model compression [12]. In use cases
where the full model training is performed by a third (possibly
untrusted) party, typically because of limited local resources, the
initial model used to generate these predictions may be a simple,
representative model, trained by the data owner on a subset of the
data. Alternatively, it may be a pre-trained model performing a
similar classification task as the target model. If no pre-existing or
minimally trained model is available, the target (class) labels may
be used instead of model predictions.
For the anonymizer model we employ a regular Decision Tree
that generates splits based on information gain (or Gini impurity)
with regard to the learning target. During the training process, we
set the minimum number of samples required to be in each leaf node
of the tree to k, and then use the leaves of the tree as the basis for
generalization. The group of training samples mapped to each leaf
is the group of at least k similar records that are mapped together
to the same generalized value. Since each leaf node contains at least
k samples from the training set, and we are going to generalize all
of those samples in the same manner, they will be indistinguishable
from each other, thus satisfying k-anonymity.
One straightforward approach to generalize features for a group
of records is to use a range (for numerical features) or sub-group
(for categorical features) that covers all records in the group. For
example, if we have three records with the age values 31, 32 and
34 respectively, these can be generalized to the age range 31-34.
Similarly, if those three records have the occupation values “nurse”,
“teacher” and “engineer”, these can be generalized to the group
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Figure 1: Complete anonymization process
[“nurse”,“teacher”,“engineer”]. However, since we want to be able
to retrain our ML model on the anonymized dataset, we need to
map these ranges and sub-groups to numerical features on which
the model can be trained.
As opposed to the method used in [20], where the d-dimensional
hyper-rectangles that represent the partitions are represented as
points in a 2d-dimensional space, we adopt a different approach.
We wanted the anonymized records to have the same domain as the
original data. This enables using the model directly on any newly
collected test data, without having to apply any special recoding
dictated by the anonymization process. In other words, we wanted
the rest of the ML lifecycle to remain unchanged. To achieve this,
we map each test sample to a concrete, representative point in the
domain of the original features. By mapping all records belonging
to the same leaf node to the same concrete value, we are able to
satisfy the k-anonymity requirement.
There are several choices for mapping the data points in each leaf
(or cluster) to a representative value. These include determining the
range of each feature as the minimum and maximum value of the
feature in the cluster and choosing the mean value of each range;
choosing the “centroid” of the cluster; or random sampling from
the cluster’s distribution. Another approach is to choose an actual
value that falls in the cluster as the representative point for that
cluster. We found that the latter entails higher prediction accuracy,
probably because it results in records that are more realistic with
regard to the original data. We chose to use the point closest to the
median of the cluster from the points with the majority label in
that cluster (this is done after the categorical features are one-hot
encoded, so all features are numeric).
Algorithm 1 describes the pseudocode for the anonymization
part of the algorithm.
Algorithm 1: Anonymization algorithm
Inputs: training data X labeled with original
model 's predictions y, list of quasi -
identifiers QI, required k value
Output: anonymized training data X
Separate X into Xqi (only QI features) and Xr est (
rest of features)
Train decision tree T on (Xqi , y) with
min_samples_leaf=k
foreach leaf node l in T :
S ← samples in l
m ← median(S )
s ← sample closest to m (using euclidean
distance)
S ' ← replace all samples in S with s
X ' ← ∪ S '
Re-attach X ' with Xr est → X
Once each of the original records is mapped to its new, repre-
sentative value, based on the leaf to which it belongs, the dataset is
k-anonymized. Finally, we retrain the model on the anonymized
data, resulting in an anonymized model that can be shared, sold
and stored freely.
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Name records total
attrs
attrs
used
categ label
Adult 48842 14 12 7 income
Loan 421095 144 43 11 loan
status
Table 1: Datasets used for evaluation
The described anonymization process is typically performed after
applying “regular” feature selection that chooses the most influen-
tial features for the desired model. The motivation for this is that if
there are features that can already be determined not to be needed
at all, there is no reason to include them in the anonymization
process, rather they should just be removed from consideration.
However, there are also advantages to applying our method with-
out any prior feature selection. For one, there are models in which
feature selection is not typically applied (such as neural networks).
In addition, when performing feature selection “blindly”, without
any additional information about which features are considered
quasi-identifiers, the feature selection process may inadvertently
select the quasi-identiers as important features, even if other, non-
identifying features could have been used instead. This may be the
case in datasets where some redundancy between features exists.
In these cases, it may be better to first apply anonymization to
the quasi-identifiers and then perform feature selection, allowing
features that have not been anonymized to be selected.
In Section 4 we show some results both with and without apply-
ing feature selection prior to the anonymization.
4 RESULTS
Our evaluation method consists of the following steps. First, we
select a dataset, train one or more original models on it (either
applying or not feature selection), and measure their accuracy. We
consider the resulting model and its accuracy as our baseline. We
then perform the anonymization process described in Section 3 and
retrain the model on the anonymized data. Finally, we measure the
accuracy of the new model on a hold-out test set.
We evaluated our method using two openly available datasets:
the Adult dataset5, an excerpt of the 1994 U.S. Census database,
which is widely used to evaluate anonymization and generalization
techniques; and the Loan dataset6, an excerpt of the Lending Club
loan data for the year 2015. This second dataset was chosen to show
that our approach also works well for data with a larger number
of attributes. A summary of the characteristics of each dataset is
presented in Table 1. For each dataset the table shows: the number
of records, the number of features in the downloaded data, the
number of features used (before applying feature selection as part
of the training process), the number of categorical features, and the
label feature.
Both of these datasets were used for binary classification tasks.
For the Adult dataset we used Neural Network (NN), XGBoost
(XGB), Decision Tree (DT) and Random Forest (RF) models. The
last two were chosen for the sake of comparison with previous
5https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/adult
6https://www.lendingclub.com/info/download-data.action
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Figure 2: Adult data with NN model
results from [20] and [16]. The neural network was composed
of one hidden layer with 100 neurons, relu activation and adam
optimizer. The batch size and number of epochs were both set to
200, and a constant learning rate of 0.001 was used. The random
forest was composed of 100 trees. Except for neural networks, in all
other cases we performed feature selection prior to anonymization.
We also chose several different sets of quasi-identifiers: we either
used all 12 attributes as QI, 10 attributes or 8 attributes. The list of
8 attributes was chosen to be similar to the one used in [16]. The
attributes used as QI in each case are detailed in Appendix A. Due
to space constraints we show results for select runs. The remainder
of the results follow similar patterns.
The data was divided into three subsets, used for: (1) training
the original model (40%), (2) training the anonymizer decision tree
model (40%), and (3) validation (20%). The 40% data that was used
to train the original model is also the dataset that is eventually
anonymized (using the process described in Section 3) and then
used to retrain the model. The validation set was used to measure
the accuracy of the new, anonymized model.
Each run of our accuracy-guided anonymization (AG) is com-
pared with three “regular” anonymization methods: the Median
Mondrain method [19], the Hilbert-curve based method [10] and
the R+ tree based method [15]. The Mondrian multidimensional
partitioning method proposes a top-down greedy approximation
algorithm for strict multidimensional partitioning. It creates mul-
tidimensional regions covering the domain space, and then con-
structs a local recording function for each region separately. The
“Hilbert” method uses the Hilbert space-filling curve to reduce the
multidimensional data to a single dimension, and then sorts and
partitions the one-dimensional data. The R+ tree method is aimed at
anonymizing very large datasets and is based on techniques taken
from the field of special indexing in databases. They use R+-trees
to efficiently k-anonymize batches of the data that are loaded into
memory. The results of these runs can be found in Figures 3 - 5. In
Section 4.1 we also compare our results with two previous efforts
at anonymization aimed for classification tasks.
For the loan dataset we used a neural network model with the
same architecture and parameters as the one used for Adult. For
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Figure 3: Adult data with NN model
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Figure 4: Adult data with feature selection
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Figure 5: Adult data with feature selection
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Figure 6: Loan data with 18 QI
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this dataset we used 18 attributes as QI. The results are presented
in Figure 6.
4.1 Discussion
Figures 3 - 6 compare the results of our accuracy-guided anonymiza-
tionmethodwith three “classic” anonymizationmethods: Mondrian,
Hilbert and R+ tree. These methods are not tailored for any specific
analysis on the resulting dataset. It is clear that in all cases, our
method outperforms these.
The most similar methods to ours are the workload-aware ano-
nymization described in [20] and the framework for anonymization
under accuracy constraints described in [16]. Both of these use the
label class value as an impurity measure when partitioning the
data. Though we cannot compare our results directly with their
implementations, we do show in Appendix B that when applying
our method on the original label values as opposed to the model’s
predictions, in some cases the resulting accuracy is lower, especially
in more complex models such as Neural Networks. This may be
due to fact that learning the “decision boundaries” of an existing
model is slightly easier than the actual learning task (based on the
true labels). In addition, we are measuring the utility of the solution
by the accuracy of the model when retrained on the anonymized
data, with the goal of reaching as close as possible to its original
accuracy, i.e., to the model’s original predictions.
In our evaluation we demonstrated the effectiveness of our
method on more modern and complex types of models than the
ones presented in these two previous works, such as XGBoost and
Neural Networks. In addition, the models they worked with had
quite a low accuracy to begin with. For example, in the work done
by LeFevre et al. [20], the initial accuracy of the Decision Treemodel
they trained on census data was around 76% and the Random For-
est approximately 72.5%. The Decision Tree model trained in [16]
had an accuracy of only 82.9%. In our experiments with the Adult
dataset, the initial accuracy of the Decision Tree model was 90.25%
and the Random Forest 91.89%. This is a very significant difference,
and may point to why, in their experiments, even the conventional
anonymization methods had an accuracy that was very close to
the original model’s accuracy, and in some cases even exceeding
it. This result comes in complete contradiction with many other
experiments where regular anonymization was applied on datasets
before training ML models or performing other data mining tasks
(e.g., [23]), as is also reflected in our own evaluation. In the Loan
dataset, we started with an even higher initial accuracy of above
93%.
It is noteworthy to point out that in many previous works, results
were demonstrated on relatively small values of k (i.e., up to 100)
and small sets of quasi-identifiers (typically 8-10). In our evaluation,
we demonstrated results for very high k values (up to 1000) and
QI sets of up to 18 attributes, which as far as we know has not
been attempted in the past. This enables providing a higher level
of privacy without suffering too large an accuracy loss.
One one hand, as previously mentioned, it is critical to include as
many attributes as QI as possible to prevent re-identification. On the
other hand, it is, of course, obvious that the number (and choice) of
quasi-identifiers is critical to the utility of the anonymized dataset,
especially in training machine learning models. The more attributes
𝑛 × 512
𝑦𝑓(𝑥)
512 × 100
100 × 64
n × 256
256 × 64128 × 1
ℎ(𝑓 𝑥 , 𝑦)
Figure 7: Attack model
that are considered QI, the more generalization must be performed
on the dataset and the higher the information loss. But if there
is enough redundancy within the data, the choice of a small set
of certain attributes may have little to no effect on the resulting
model, as was the case, for example, in our experiments with the
loan dataset when performing feature selection (resulting in only 4
QI attributes out of 11 selected features). However, we were able
to demonstrate that using our method, even with high numbers of
quasi-identifiers, the resulting accuracy is still satisfactory.
4.2 Defending against inference attacks
Next, we demonstrate the effect of using our anonymizationmethod
to defend against membership inference attacks, such as the one
decribed in [30]. We trained both a random forest and neural net-
work model on the Adult and Loan datasets. The random forest was
implemented using 100 trees and Gini impurity as the split criterion.
The neural network architecture consisted of three fully-connected
layers of sizes 1024, 512 and 256, tanh activation, and Adam opti-
mizer with learning rate 0.0001. Each model’s initial accuracy is
documented in Table 2.
The attack model consisted of an architecture similar to the one
used by Nasr et al. [26] but slightly shallower and with smaller
layers, as depicted in Figure 7. n represents the number of target
classes in the attacked model, f(x) is either the logit (in case the
attacked model is a neural network) or probability (in case of a
random forest model) of each class, and y is the one-hot encoded
true label. Also similar to this paper, we employed a strong attack,
that assumes knowledge of (part of) the training data used to train
the original model. We labeled the data points that were used in
training the original model as members, and the data that was
not used as non-members, and trained the attack model with 50%
members and 50% non-members. In some cases we observed that
using a simple random forest as the attack model also worked
similarly well.
We then trained each of the initial models on different anony-
mized versions of the datasets. For the Adult dataset we used all
features as QI and for the Loan dataset we used the same set of 18
features as in previous experiments. Those results are presented in
Anonymizing Machine Learning Models
Dataset, model & mitigation Train accuracy Test accuracy Attack accuracy Precision Recall
Adult, RF 0.98 0.83 0.58 0.56 0.78
Adult, RF, k=50 0.85 0.83 0.51 0.51 0.33
Adult, RF, k=100 0.85 0.81 0.5 0.5 0.76
Adult, RF, epsilon=10 0.82 0.81 0.53 0.52 0.95
Adult, RF, epsilon=1 0.8 0.79 0.5 0.52 0.13
Adult, NN 0.96 0.89 0.53 0.52 0.6
Adult, NN, k=25 0.84 0.82 0.5 0.5 0.71
Adult, NN, k=50 0.84 0.81 0.5 0.5 0.32
Adult, NN, epsilon=2.11, delta=e-05 0.83 0.83 0.5 0.5 0.14
Loan, RF 1.0 0.92 0.67 0.65 0.71
Loan, RF, k=100 1.0 0.92 0.51 0.51 0.29
Loan, RF, epsilon=10 0.82 0.81 0.5 0.66 0.0094
Loan, RF, epsilon=1 0.82 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.18
Loan, NN 0.95 0.95 0.54 0.53 0.67
Loan, NN, k=200 0.95 0.92 0.5 0.5 0.46
Loan, NN, epsilon=3.1, delta=e-05 0.87 0.87 0.5 0.5 0.47
Table 2: Mitigations against membership inference. The first two columns refer to the attacked model and the last three refer
to the attack itself.
Table 2. It is clear from these results that the attack can be mostly
prevented using our anonymization method, with a very low accu-
racy cost.
For comparison we also applied differential privacy (DP) as a
possible mitigation against the membership attack. For the random
forest model we used the implementation of Fletcher and Islam7
[6]. For the neural network we used the torch-dp library8, whose
implementation is based on the principles in Abadi et al. [1]. The
results acheived using differential privacy were comparable to our
anonymization results in terms of the achieved model accuracy
versus attack accuracy. In some cases, DP acheived slightly higher
model accuracy for the same attack mitigation level, but in most
cases the DP implementation did slightly worse. In the case of the
Loan dataset there was a pretty significant 5-11% test accuracy gap
in favor of our method. Those results can also be found in Table 2.
It is worth noting that the difference in the performance overhead
when using the differential privacy methods was very noticeable, as
well as the added complexity of having to use different implemen-
tations for the different model types, and even ML frameworks. In
the case of our anonymization approach, the same method can be
applied regardless of theMLmodel, framework and implementation
details.
We also tested the efficiency of using our anonymization method
to defend against attribute inference attacks, such as the one de-
scribed in [7]. For this evaluation we used the Nursery dataset9,
and the ‘social’ feature as the attacked feature. Table 3 shows the
effectiveness of the attack on a decision tree model, with and with-
out applying anonymization to the dataset. These results show that
our method can also be effective against attribute inference.
It is important to note that the anonymization-based method
does not work well for highly dimensional datasets, especially
7https://github.com/sam-fletcher/Smooth_Random_Trees
8https://github.com/facebookresearch/pytorch-dp
9https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/nursery
Dataset, model &
mitigation
Test
accuracy
Attack
accuracy
Precision Recall
Nursery, DT 0.68 0.61 0.41 0.32
Nursery, DT, k=100 0.74 0.56 0.31 0.21
Table 3: Mitigation against attribute inference. The first
column refers to the attacked model and the last three
refer to the attack itself. All features were used as
quasi-identifiers.
with a high level of uniqueness of records. For example, when we
tried to apply this method to the Purchase100 dataset described
in [30], we were not able to acheive a model accuracy of more
than 24% (from the original 66% accuracy), even when using the
smallest possible value of k, i.e., k=2. In contrast, the differentially
private implementation was able to achieve up to 42% accuracy
(still significantly lower that the original accuracy, but much better
than anonymization).
5 CONCLUSIONS
We presented a novel machine learning model anonymization
method. This method applies a model-specific accuracy-guided ano-
nymization to the training dataset, then retrains the model on the
anonymized data to yield an anonymized model. This anonymized
model is free of any privacy obligations, as it no longer contains
any personal data, and can be freely used, shared or sold to third
parties. This is a very desirable quality for many organizations.
The accuracy-guided anonymization method outperforms state
of the art anonymization techniques in terms of the achieved utility,
as measured by the resulting model’s accuracy. It also enables apply-
ing anonymization in previously unattainable situations, i.e., when
employing complex machine learning models with high initial accu-
racy, using large values of k and large numbers of quasi-identifiers.
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This enables providing stronger privacy than previously possible,
without suffering from great accuracy loss, making anonymous
machine learning a feasible option in many cases.
In addition, this method is able to achieve similar results in
its ability to prevent membership inference attacks as alternative
approaches based on differential privacy, while being much less
complex and resource-intensive. It does not assume the availability
of similar public datasets, and does not even assume any control
over the training process. It is thus well suited for scenarios where
the private data owner does not possess enough local resources to
perform this complex training process, and rather relies on external
parties, e.g., ML-as-a-service, to perform the training. Moreover, the
presented method can even defend against other classes of attacks
such as attribute inference.
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Anonymizing Machine Learning Models
A QUASI-IDENTIFIERS
Table 4 presents the attributes used as quasi-identifiers in the dif-
ferent runs.
Dataset # QI QI attributes
Adult 12 age, workclass, education-num, marital-status,
occupation, relationship, race, sex, capital-gain,
capital-loss, hours-per-week, native-country
Adult 10 age, workclass, education-num, marital-status, oc-
cupation, relationship, race, sex, hours-per-week,
native-country
Adult 8 workclass, marital-status, occupation, relationship,
race, sex, native-country, education-num
Loan 18 emp_length, home_ownership, annual_income,
zip_code, purpose, dti, delinq_2yrs, inq_last_-
6mths, mths_since_last_delinq, open_acc, total_-
acc, mths_since_last_record, pub_rec, revol_bal,
revol_util, hardship_flag, last_pymnt_amnt, install-
ment
Table 4: Quasi-identifiers used for evaluation
B MODEL PREDICTIONS VERSUS TRUE
LABELS
Figure 8 presents the difference between applying our method
on the original model’s predictions (AGpred) and the true labels
(AGlabel).
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Figure 8: Training on model predictions vs. true labels
